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ABSTRACT 
Private equity’s original purpose was to optimize companies’ governance and 
operations. Reuniting ownership and control in corporate America, the 
leveraged buyout (or the mere threat thereof) undoubtedly helped reform 
management practices in a broad swath of U.S. companies. Due to mounting 
competitive pressures, however, private equity is finding relatively fewer 
underperforming companies to fix. This is particularly true of U.S. public 
companies, which are continuously dogged by activist hedge funds and other 
empowered shareholders looking for any sign of slack. 
In response, private equity is shifting its center of gravity away from 
governance reform, towards a dizzying array of new tactics and new asset 
classes. Large private equity firms now simultaneously run leveraged buyout 
funds, credit funds, real estate funds, alternative investments funds, and even 
hedge funds. The difficulty is that some of the new money-making strategies are 
less likely to be value increasing than governance and operational 
improvements. Moreover, they introduce conflicts of interest and complexities 
that alter private equity’s role in corporate governance. Private equity’s 
governance advantage has always been to ensure that companies are the servant 
of only one master. Yet today the master itself may have divided loyalties and 
attention. With few gains left to be had from governance reforms, private equity 
is quietly distancing itself from the corporate governance revolution that it 
helped bring about. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every business school student in the United States has heard some version of 
the following tale, designed to show that private equity ownership is superior to 
the public-company governance model. It begins with a description of the pre-
1980s bad old days, in which entrenched, lazy, and cash-hoarding management 
went unchecked in public companies, while passive shareholders could only 
look on in dismay.1 But lo, private equity suddenly emerged as a knight in 
shining armor, reuniting ownership and control in corporate America and 
turning bloated, inefficient companies into slimmed-down cash machines.2 It is 
a nice tale—for shareholders, certainly—but one that may no longer be true, 
because along the way both private equity and public companies have changed. 
Take public companies. The rise of institutional investors, the widespread 
adoption of the shareholder value gospel, and the flourishing market for 
corporate control have put a stake in unrepentant managerialism. Most visibly, 
hedge fund activists began seriously taking American management to task in the 
2000s and never looked back.3 The threat of activist campaigns has altered 
management practices not only at the firms they target, but at most public firms.4 
While U.S. public companies today are far from perfect, they can no longer get 
away with merely gesturing toward shareholder interests.5 As others have noted, 
there are diminishing marginal returns for corporate governance improvements 
in any given firm,6 and for most firms and most industries, it appears that we are 
already close to the plateau. 
 
1 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (describing agency problems in large public 
corporations in the 1980s, including management’s incentives to retain too much cash in the 
corporation, rather than returning it to shareholders). 
2 See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 
1989, at 61, 61-62. 
3 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889, 
896 (2013). 
4 See DELOITTE, CFO SIGNALS: WHAT NORTH AMERICA’S TOP FINANCE EXECUTIVES ARE 
THINKING—AND DOING 3 (2015) (“About half of CFOs say their companies have made at 
least one major business decision specifically in response to activism.”); Nickolay Gantchev, 
Oleg R. Gredil & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Governance Under the Gun: Spillover Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism, REV. FIN., Nov. 16, 2018, at 1, 1 (discussing how threat of hedge fund 
activism impacts behavior of non-targeted firms). 
5 See Martin Lipton, Watchtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds 
and Other Activist Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 25, 
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/25/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-
other-activist-investors-2/ [https://perma.cc/L3KZ-JRBJ] (stating that every company 
“should regularly review its business portfolio and strategy and its governance and executive 
compensation issues” to prevent activist attacks). 
6 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of 
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1818 (2008). 
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At the same time, private equity’s business model has changed almost beyond 
recognition. The classic private equity strategy is the leveraged buyout (“LBO”), 
in which the fund acquires a public or private company, levers up its capital 
structure, makes operational improvements, and then sells the company or takes 
it public after a few years.7 The potential governance advantages of LBOs are 
many, including the sponsors’ willingness to cut costs and replace management, 
the disciplining effect of high leverage, the careful monitoring provided by a 
small, incentivized board that meets frequently, and so on.8 The private equity 
model is getting squeezed on all sides, however. The newly reformed crop of 
public companies means that there are simply fewer gains to be had from 
improving U.S. companies’ governance and operations by taking them private; 
activist hedge funds and other institutional investors have already done the 
heavy lifting. Tellingly, the major studies showing that LBOs have a positive 
impact on firms’ governance and operations tend to draw data from earlier 
decades or from abroad,9 with rare exceptions.10  
Meanwhile, private equity is also struggling to find private targets to acquire 
and improve. Large companies today are finding it easier to grow through 
acquisitions than organically.11 These so-called “strategic” acquirers are 
snatching up private firms eager for capital that in the past would have been ideal 
candidates for private equity acquisitions.12 Separately, venture capital funds are 
expanding into fields beyond tech, holding onto portfolio companies for longer, 
and even becoming comfortable with debt financing, further crowding out 
private equity.13 Unlike with its public-company targets, private equity surely 
 
7 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 121, 124-25, 128-29 (2009). 
8 See id. at 130-32. 
9 See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence 
from Private Equity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 368, 370 (2012) (examining LBO data from Western 
Europe, between 1991 and 2007); Shai Bernstein et al., Private Equity and Industry 
Performance, 63 MGMT. SCI. 1198, 1198 (2017) (using global data between 1991 and 2009); 
Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, Do Private Equity Owned Firms Have 
Better Management Practices?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 442, 442 (2015) (presenting global data 
on management practices at private equity-owned firms); Serdar Aldatmaz & Gregory W. 
Brown, Private Equity in the Global Economy: Evidence on Industry Spillovers 4 (29th 
Annual Conference on Financial Economics & Accounting 2018, Univ. N.C. Kenan-Flagler 
Research Paper No. 2013-9, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=218 
9707 (presenting data on private equity investments in forty-eight countries). 
10 See, e.g., Shai Bernstein & Albert Sheen, The Operational Consequences of Private 
Equity Buyouts: Evidence from the Restaurant Industry, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 2387, 2394-95 
(2016) (examining data from Florida restaurants between 2002 and 2012). 
11 See Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1690 (2013). 
12 Id. 
13 See Howard Marks, What to Know Before Going into Venture Debt, FORBES (May 13, 
2018, 9:03 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/05/13/what-to-know-
before-going-into-venture-debt/#c68e86b78b24 [https://perma.cc/977X-PHV8]. 
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still shines at improving governance and operations in small, private 
companies—particularly family-owned businesses.14 The question is whether 
these firms can be reached before others swoop in. While private equity today is 
awash (and perhaps drowning) in cash,15 so is everyone else. That means firm 
valuations are soaring, making it less likely that private equity will find attractive 
targets and that its returns will remain high for much longer.16 
These competitive pressures are already manifesting in the data. A growing 
body of empirical studies finds that private equity returns are substantially lower 
than sponsors generally claim.17 More revealing still, the return data show that 
private equity investments now perform either worse than, or no better than, 
leveraged investments in public equities.18 Simply put, private equity’s primary 
contribution to U.S. firms today appears to be cheap debt financing, rather than 
governance, strategy, and operations.19 Nowhere is the decline of the traditional 
 
14 See Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, supra note 9, at 444 (finding that private equity-
owned firms employ superior management practices to family-owned firms, but not to public 
companies with dispersed share ownership). 
15 See Javier Espinoza, Private Equity Funds Active in Market Reach All-Time High, FIN. 
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c74e10c6-47d2-11e8-8ae9-4b5ddcca99 
b3 (describing record-breaking fundraising by private equity funds). 
16 See BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2018, at 4-5 (2018), https://www.bain 
.com/contentassets/3edd976974b8409da6d5569c71533213/bain_report_2018_private_equit
y_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTT3-YJ2N] (finding that valuation multiples are at “historic 
highs,” exceeding even levels seen immediately prior to the global financial crisis). 
17 First, a series of papers documents the decline in private equity fund returns over time. 
See, e.g., Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven N. Kaplan, How Do Private Equity 
Investments Perform Compared to Public Equity?, 14 J. INV. MGMT. 14, 15 (2016); Ludovic 
Phalippou, Performance of Buyout Funds Revisited?, 18 REV. FIN. 189, 189 (2014); Ludovic 
Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity Funds, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1747, 1747 (2009); Berk A. Sensoy, Yingdi Wang & Michael S. Weibach, Limited 
Partner Performance and the Maturing of the Private Equity Industry, 112 J. FIN. ECON. 320, 
341-42 (2014). A second line of research shows a decline in the persistence of private equity 
sponsors’ performance from one fund to the next—an indication of increased competition in 
the industry. See Reiner Braun, Tim Jenkinson & Ingo Stoff, How Persistent Is Private Equity 
Performance? Evidence from Deal-Level Data, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 273, 276 (2017). But see 
Arthur Korteweg & Morten Sorensen, Skill and Luck in Private Equity Performance, 124 J. 
FIN. ECON. 535, 555 (2017). Finally, there is considerable evidence that private equity returns 
are highly cyclical, which calls into question the view that private equity offers significant 
diversification benefits relative to investing in public equities. See Viral V. Acharya, Julian 
Franks & Henri Servaes, Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44, 46 
(2007); Andrew Ang et al., Estimating Private Equity Returns from Limited Partner Cash 
Flows, 73 J. FIN. 1751, 1751 (2018). 
18 See Ang et al., supra note 17, at 1782 (concluding that volatility for private equity is at 
least as high as for standard equity indices, and that private equity is akin to a levered 
investment in small and mid-cap equities); Daniel Rasmussen, Private Equity: Overvalued 
and Overrated?, AM. AFF., Spring 2018, at 4. 
19 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 115, 120-21 (2013); Victoria Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity Advantage: 
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private equity approach more obvious than in its failures in the retail industry, 
culminating painfully in the 2017 bankruptcy of Toys “R” Us.20 In lieu of 
making the major investments needed to transition brick-and-mortar retailers 
into the e-commerce age, private equity funds combatted their lower prospects 
of generating returns by doubling down on the use of leverage.21  
Indeed, private equity firms appear to be responding to their newly 
competitive environment not by increasing their efforts at governance, but by 
switching tactics to drive returns and even branching out into new asset classes.22 
Large private equity firms now simultaneously run LBO funds, credit funds, real 
estate funds, alternative investments funds, and even hedge funds.23 They create 
new industries by pushing for the privatization of traditional government 
services.24 In a stunning role reversal, they have even begun underwriting major 
corporate loans.25 Along the way, even their own governance structure has 
changed: several of the largest private equity firms are now themselves public 
companies26—a tacit acknowledgment by the industry that private ownership is 
not destiny for all firms. All this is to say that “private equity” has become a 
misnomer for the industry. 
Ironically, in comparison to governance and operational improvements, these 
new strategies may in fact play better to the built-in advantages of the larger 
private equity firms: extraordinary financial sophistication; deep and lucrative 
connections to financing sources; and, perhaps, the ability to time markets.27 Nor 
should we be surprised at how quickly the private equity industry is evolving: 
 
Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship Banking, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2462, 2462-63 
(2011). 
20 See Paul Sullivan, 3 Investments That May Have Hit Their Peak, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/your-money/investment-private-equity-venture 
-capital.html. 
21 See id. 
22 See infra Section III.A. 
23 See Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315, 342 
(2017). 
24 See Danielle Ivory, Ben Protess & Griff Palmer, In American Towns, Pumping Private 
Profits from Public Works, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2016, at A1; Brian Alexander, Privatization 
Is Changing America’s Relationship with Its Physical Stuff, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/infrastructure-private-public-partners 
hips/533256/. 
25 See Mark Vandevelde, Private Equity, Public Lenders, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2018, at 7; 
Marcel Grupp, Taking the Lead: When Non-Banks Arrange Syndicated Loans 3 (Sustainable 
Architecture for Fin. in Eur., Working Paper No. 100, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=26021 
96. 
26 See Kevin Dowd, Private Equity Goes Public: A History of PE Stock Performance, 
PITCHBOOK (May 20, 2016), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/private-equity-goes-public-
a-history-of-pe-stock-performance [https://perma.cc/58TR-E67V]. 
27 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 123. 
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its compensation scheme incentivizes private equity managers to pursue returns 
regardless of their source.28 
The difficulty is that some of the new money-making strategies are less likely 
to be value increasing than the traditional governance optimization approach.29 
Moreover, they introduce conflicts of interest and complexities that alter private 
equity’s role in corporate governance.30 Private equity’s governance advantage 
has always been to ensure that companies are the servant of only one master. 
Yet today the master itself may have divided loyalties and attention. With few 
gains left to be had from governance reforms, private equity is quietly distancing 
itself from the corporate governance revolution that it helped bring about. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the heyday of private 
equity’s traditional strategy of optimizing firms’ governance and operations. 
Part II explains how competition from inside and outside the industry is pushing 
private equity away from its traditional focus on governance. Part III briefly 
describes how private equity has altered its strategies and how the resulting 
complexity and conflicts of interest create uncertainty as to private equity’s role 
in corporate governance going forward. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL GOVERNANCE APPROACH: THE GOLDEN AGE 
Private equity has undeniably played a key role in the dramatic transformation 
of U.S. corporate governance over the last few decades. Beginning with the very 
first major LBOs in the 1980s, private equity’s salvo signaled the beginning of 
the end of uncontested managerialism in the United States. Public companies 
were put on notice that even if their shareholders were asleep at the wheel, they 
would nonetheless have to pay heed to shareholder value or risk a takeover.31 In 
the so-called middle market, by contrast, private equity firms generally targeted 
private companies lacking financial and managerial experience.32 Family-owned 
businesses, for example, made highly attractive targets for LBOs, ideally 
combining a sound business model with inefficient operations or an inefficient 
capital structure.33 
 
28 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private 
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2008) (describing typical compensation scheme for 
private equity funds). 
29 See infra Part III. 
30 See infra Part III. 
31 See Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate 
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51-52 (1988) (describing 
active market for corporate control in 1980s). 
32 John L. Chapman & Peter G. Klein, Value Creation in Middle-Market Buyouts: A 
Transaction-Level Analysis, in PRIVATE EQUITY: FUND TYPES, RISKS AND RETURNS, AND 
REGULATION 229, 245-46 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2011). 
33 See Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, supra note 9, at 442 (using survey evidence to show 
that private equity-owned companies adopt better management practices than similar family-
owned companies). 
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In both cases—the massive public-company LBO and the acquisition of 
smaller private companies—private equity ownership could result in major 
improvements in the target company. This Part briefly describes this ideal 
version of private equity, in which private equity firms make substantial value-
increasing contributions to their portfolio companies’ governance and 
operations. 
A. Efficient Governance 
When Professor Michael Jensen predicted the “[e]clipse of the [p]ublic 
[c]orporation” in 1989, he did so with private equity in mind as the ideal 
alternative governance model for firms.34 Ever since Berle and Means published 
their classic treatise on corporations, the perceived defect of public company 
governance has been the problem of the separation of ownership and control.35 
While raising capital from the general public can lower a firm’s cost of capital 
and allow it to reach significant scale, it is incompatible with investors 
themselves managing the firm. Equityholders must instead delegate 
management of the firm to hired managers. While unquestionably more efficient 
than management by dispersed shareholders, delegated management introduces 
its own problem, referred to as the agency costs of management.36 Because 
dispersed public-company shareholders have little incentive or ability to monitor 
management closely, managers have the opportunity to privilege their personal 
interests over shareholders’ interests.37 
The birth of private equity offered a brilliant solution to this conundrum: 
private equity funds were able to raise or borrow enough capital to finance even 
very large companies, without resorting to dispersed share ownership. Typically, 
a private equity firm (or “sponsor”)—a team of investment professionals—
forms a fund to pool equity capital, primarily from institutional investors.38 The 
fund then uses this capital, along with a large proportion of borrowed funds, to 
acquire and hold portfolio companies for several years.39 Although the private 
 
34 Jensen, supra note 2, at 61. 
35 See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 277-79 (1933). 
36 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) 
(introducing concept of agency costs). 
37 Id. at 308-09. 
38 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 123. For a comprehensive description of, and 
justification for, the structure of investments funds—including private equity funds—see John 
Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and 
Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014) (explaining why investment pools and their managers 
are segregated into different entities). 
39 Leverage is a key feature of private equity investments. Anywhere from thirty to seventy 
percent of the target company’s capital structure will be comprised of loans or bonds issued 
by the target in connection with the acquisition by the private equity fund. See Kaplan & 
Strömberg, supra note 7, at 124-25. 
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equity fund may have a large number of investors, the fund itself serves as the 
sole equity owner of each portfolio company, and decision-making by the fund 
is in the hands of a single manager: the private equity sponsor. 
Thus, in Jensen’s view, private equity acquisitions had the considerable 
advantage of reuniting ownership and control in large firms, by replacing 
dispersed shareholders with a sole owner that was also the sole manager. To be 
sure, this description of private equity was in some respects inaccurate even at 
the time when Jensen was writing. Private equity firms do not actually run their 
portfolio companies on a day-to-day basis; they delegate to hired officers just as 
public-company boards do.40 Yet by staffing the board, they are at least directly 
responsible for key decision-making and the hiring and oversight of the officers. 
Described below are the various governance contributions that private equity 
firms can make to their portfolio companies, in the ideal case. 
1. Better Monitoring 
With private equity, dispersed, passive shareholders are replaced by a single 
shareholder that has the resources and incentives to monitor corporate officers 
closely.41 First, private equity portfolio company boards look and behave 
differently than public-company boards.42 The former are smaller—composed 
exclusively or primarily of principals of the private equity firm—and they meet 
comparatively frequently.43 Most importantly, unlike directors serving on 
public-company boards, the economic stakes for directors of private equity 
portfolio companies are very high. Private equity firms generally staff the board 
of a portfolio company with the lead principals responsible for the investment, 
and they intentionally tie these principals’ compensation closely to the portfolio 
company’s success.44 
In addition, private equity has a built-in mechanism to ensure that managers 
remain disciplined: the heavy debt loads that they impose on their portfolio 
companies. Unlike public-company managers in Michael Jensen’s caricature, 
who oversee bloated corporate empires flush with cash, the discretion of 
portfolio company officers is severely constrained.45 With major debt payments 
 
40 See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017). 
41 See Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, supra note 9, at 442-43 (concluding that private 
equity ownership is associated with improved monitoring, based on survey data from thirty-
four countries). 
42 See Francesca Cornelli & Ōguzhan Karakas, Private Equity and Corporate 
Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards?, in 1 GLOBALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE 
INVESTMENTS WORKING PAPERS VOLUME 1: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVATE 
EQUITY REPORT 2008, at 65, 72 (World Econ. Forum ed., 2008). 
43 See id. at 66. 
44 See id. at 72-73. 
45 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 324 (describing how firm leverage can be used to constrain 
management and thereby reduce agency costs). 
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always looming on the horizon, officers must manage cash carefully and operate 
as leanly as possible. 
2. Better Incentives 
Much of the claimed difficulty with dispersed share ownership in public 
companies lies in the divergence between the incentives of shareholders and 
those of managers. By contrast, the private equity model does much to realign 
the incentives of corporate officers with those of the shareholder (the private 
equity fund, and, indirectly, the institutional investors invested in the private 
equity fund). Evidence suggests that: (1) they are willing to pay managers more, 
as a percentage of the value of the business, than public-company shareholders; 
(2) the compensation is more heavily tilted toward equity compensation, 
creating “high-powered” incentives for managers; and (3) vesting and payout 
are tied to major liquidity events for the company, prompting all parties to work 
toward a favorable exit for the private equity fund.46 
B. Efficient Operations 
Private equity firms do not pursue good governance for its own sake. The 
goal, of course, is for private equity’s governance advantage to translate into an 
advantage in firm value, including through greater operational efficiency. This 
is the theory of private equity most often promoted by the industry itself and its 
proponents: private equity ownership leads to more efficient firms.47 There are 
several plausible paths from governance to firm value in this case. First, better 
incentivized, smaller, and more focused boards might make better strategic 
decisions for the firm, with respect to major corporate events such as mergers 
and acquisitions (“M&A”) and product lines.48 Second, private equity firms may 
be more willing than typical management to make difficult decisions that 
improve operational efficiency, such as approving layoffs, spinning off 
underperforming divisions, and even replacing top executives.49 Most 
 
46 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 130-31; Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. 
Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives 
on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 251-52 (2009). 
47 See, e.g., Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating 
Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 217-18 (1989); EY, Private Equity CFOs Rank 
Operational Efficiency as Top Priority, But Take Varied Approaches to Technology, Talent 




48 See supra note 42-44 and accompanying text. 
49 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 132 (describing one study’s finding that in 
private equity portfolio companies with poorly performing management, “one-third of chief 
executive officers . . . are replaced in the first 100 days while two-thirds are replaced at some 
point over a four-year period”). Unlike other corporate management, private equity firms tend 
not to have any personal stakes or close personal relationships in their portfolio companies, 
  
2019] THE PRIVATE EQUITY GOVERNANCE ADVANTAGE 1105 
 
significantly, private equity firms are incentivized by their compensation 
arrangement with their own investors to maximize their portfolio companies’ 
leverage,50 something that public-company managers have been more reluctant 
to do. Because managers at public companies may lose not only their jobs but a 
significant portion of their wealth (assuming that they hold company stock) if 
their firm goes bankrupt, they have incentives to keep the firm’s leverage low 
relative to the optimum predicted by finance theory.51 In this view, private equity 
firms are more likely to optimize a firm’s capital structure than public-company 
managers, thereby capturing the tax advantages of debt financing over equity 
financing and necessitating lean operations.52 
Thus, the ideal of private equity-style corporate governance is a model in 
which the incentives of owners and managers are tightly aligned, the owner 
closely monitors the corporate officers, and the private equity firm brings 
expertise and efficiency to the firm’s capital structure and operations. The next 
Part describes how intense competition from within and without the private 
equity industry means that private equity’s traditional governance strategy 
should no longer be expected to generate the same high returns as in prior 
decades, and that the space for private equity sponsors to make governance 
improvements in the first place has narrowed considerably. 
II. COMPETITION IN THE LBO SPACE: ANYTHING YOU CAN DO I CAN DO 
BETTER 
By many measures, it is the best of times for private equity. Now considered 
an established asset class, private equity attracts substantial allocations of capital 
from institutional investors of all types. Recent fundraising continues to break 
records, leaving many sponsors to turn away investors’ money rather than chase 
it.53 And while interest rates may be inching upward as U.S. monetary policy 
tightens, they remain low by historical standards, allowing private equity funds 
 
because they do not found companies and because they acquire companies with the intention 
to exit the investment within a few years.  
50 Private equity firms typically receive a significant portion (e.g., twenty percent) of the 
profits from any of their funds’ investments, but do not bear any losses. Id. at 123-24. This 
option-like compensation rewards risk-taking by the private equity firm, including through 
tactics such as using leverage. See id. 
51 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 324 (explaining why public-company management has 
private incentives to minimize their firms’ debt loads); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 
140-41 (finding that private equity-owned companies use more debt in their capital structure 
than comparable public companies). 
52 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 134-35, 140-41. It is often also claimed that 
private equity firms increase operational efficiency by contributing their own expertise or by 
hiring industry experts to join the executive teams of their portfolio companies. This 
advantage is somewhat less plausible, however. It is unclear why private equity principals 
primarily trained in finance would have an advantage in achieving operational efficiency over 
public-company managers with significant industry experience or with equal access to 
external experts.  
53 See BAIN & CO., supra note 16, at 2. 
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to make the highly levered acquisitions that the private equity business model 
envisions.54 
Upon closer inspection, however, private equity today appears to be a victim 
of its own success. Competition from inside and outside the asset class threatens 
both its highly touted returns and its governance advantage. 
Within the industry, the number of private equity funds and investor inflows 
continue to skyrocket.55 If the funds raised outpace the value-increasing 
opportunities for private equity investments, as many observers now claim is 
likely, then investor returns will necessarily decline.56 Private equity is well past 
its halcyon days as a small, select club of sponsors that could not avoid making 
money if they tried. Today’s private equity industry is a crowded space indeed, 
running the gamut from one-person shops to the massive fund groups. 
Competition among buyout funds for acquisition targets is so severe that the 
industry is struggling to deploy the staggering amounts of capital (or “dry 
powder”) that it has raised.57 As one would expect for an increasingly 
competitive industry, the empirical evidence suggests that the private equity 
industry’s longer-term trends are towards lower returns (or, more precisely, 
returns similar to those of investing in public companies).58 
To be sure, while greater competition among private equity sponsors means 
lower returns, it does not necessarily follow that sponsors will devote less 
attention to governance in the aggregate—just as lower profits for producers in 
any competitive market do not entail less production overall. A better 
explanation for private equity’s turn away from governance is that there are now 
fewer opportunities for governance improvements in the first place. Indeed, what 
has received less attention than private equity’s internal competition is the severe 
competition that it now faces from outside the industry, in particular from other 
types of investment funds and from strategic acquirers. This Part describes the 
key external forces that are chipping away at private equity’s corporate 
governance advantage. 
A. Activist Hedge Funds 
If private equity is to generate above-market returns from reforming public 
companies’ governance, it requires a large pool of public companies with 
suboptimal governance that are also feasible targets for an LBO.59 Specifically, 
buyout funds ideally seek mature public companies with stable cash flows; 
assets that are easy to use as collateral; disloyal, incompetent, or inexperienced 
management; a suboptimal (e.g., cash-heavy) capital structure; inefficient 
operations and strategy; and inefficient management compensation schemes. For 
 
54 Id. at 3, 29. 
55 See Espinoza, supra note 15. 
56 See id. 
57 See BAIN & CO., supra note 16, at 3. 
58 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
59 See Jensen, supra note 2, at 65. 
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several reasons, these conditions are significantly less likely to be satisfied than 
in private equity’s early years. The gradual disappearance of retail investors 
directly holding stock in public companies means that ownership of public 
companies today is not only predominantly institutional, but increasingly 
concentrated.60 As a result, the collective action problems that long prevented 
shareholders from successfully monitoring management are rapidly dissipating. 
While early predictions of a wave of activism in the 1990s by institutional 
investors such as mutual funds proved premature, it is undeniable that 
institutional investors have flexed their collective muscles since then and 
profoundly affected public-company governance.61 
Activist hedge funds especially have established themselves as crusaders for 
shareholder interests, displaying not only the incentives but the ability to monitor 
public-company managers and to force their hand on key corporate events.62 For 
each type of advantage claimed by private equity—governance-related, 
financial, operational, or strategic—activist hedge funds may plausibly claim to 
do the same or better.63  
First, on the corporate governance front, activist hedge funds may make a 
wide range of contributions. They are well known for toppling underperforming 
directors and CEOs of even the largest U.S. public companies, using tactics 
ranging from friendly negotiations with boards to full-blown proxy fights.64 
Further, they arguably improve the functioning of public-company boards. 
When activist-sponsored candidates serve on boards, they tend to be better 
incentivized than their fellow directors.65 And rather than relying solely on 
management for information, like traditional board members do, activist hedge 
funds often seek out or even generate their own sources of information, for 
example by conducting interviews of the target company’s former employees.66 
Separately, they have played a significant role in reducing barriers to shareholder 
 
60 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 874-75. 
61 See id. at 886-87. 
62 See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1731-32 (2008). 
63 To clarify, this Article makes no claims as to the overall social welfare effects of either 
hedge funds or private equity, which are heavily debated. Rather, the focus here is on their 
respective impacts on firm value. 
64 See Brav et al., supra note 62, at 1732. 
65 See Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the 
Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 670 (2016). 
66 For example, in its campaign against Darden Restaurants, activist hedge fund Starboard 
Value interviewed former employees of Olive Garden at length in preparing its white paper 
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democracy; for example, by campaigning against staggered boards and poison 
pills.67 
Second, if private equity’s governance advantage stems largely from its 
greater willingness to employ leverage, then activist hedge funds are preempting 
private equity firms here as well. Increased payout to shareholders is a frequent 
rallying cry for activist hedge funds, and higher payout tends to increase a firm’s 
leverage, whether or not it is accompanied by new borrowing.68 Hedge fund 
activists increase payout ratios by demanding increased dividends or share 
repurchases (“buybacks”) from the firms they target.69 
Third, activist hedge funds may act directly on firm operations, by 
encouraging cost-cutting measures such as slashing R&D budgets or reducing 
the firm’s workforce—tactics that are straight from the private equity 
playbook.70 Activist hedge funds have recently targeted companies such as 
Apple, DuPont, Google, and Microsoft for their high R&D expenditures.71 The 
stated rationale for these measures is to remedy managers’ inherent tendencies 
toward overconfidence, empire building, and other agency problems,72 which is 
precisely the same rationale originally used to justify LBOs.  
Fourth, and finally, like private equity funds, activist hedge funds often push 
companies to make major strategic decisions, including pursuing M&A 
transactions and spin-offs.73  
Crucially, the zone of influence of activist hedge funds is not limited to the 
firms that they target. Instead, managers at any public company that is a potential 
target of an activist campaign have incentives to unilaterally adopt activist-
friendly policies—such as high payout, cost reductions, and sales of 
underperforming assets or divisions—in order to stave off an actual campaign 
 
67 See Brav et al., supra note 62, at 1744. On the other hand, many view the current trend 
toward dual-class stock—a device that nakedly entrenches corporate insiders—as a reaction 
to the widespread influence of activist shareholders.  
68 See id. at 1771 (discussing the activist strategy of increasing payouts). As shareholder’s 
equity declines through payout, the portion of the firm’s capital structure represented by debt 
increases (unless firm is entirely equity-financed, in which case greater payout simply causes 
the firm to shrink in size). See id. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 1741. 
71 Alon Brav et al., How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?, 130 
J. FIN. ECON. 237, 238 n.5 (2018). 
72 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1136 (2015). Contra John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, 
The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. 
CORP. L. 545, 548-52 (2016). 
73 For example, hedge funds have pressed McDonald’s and Wendy’s to spin off major 
assets; induced management changes at Heinz, KT&G, and Time Warner; and pushed for 
M&A deals between companies such as Euronext and Deutsche Börse, Steve Madden and VF 
Corporation, and their own acquisitions of firms such as Kmart and Circuit City. See Marcel 
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024-25, 1029-42 (2007). 
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that might result in the loss of their jobs.74 Thus, although the aggregate capital 
devoted to activist hedge funds is negligible in proportion to the total market 
capitalization of U.S. public companies, activist hedge funds have had enormous 
influence on public company governance. 
Why is the rise of activist hedge funds problematic for the traditional private 
equity model? The increasing overlap between the two ultimately decreases 
investment opportunities for private equity. We need not resolve here whether 
hedge fund activism actually increases value in public companies—a matter of 
ongoing dispute—but only note that activist strategies are preempting those of 
private equity and shrinking the pool of private equity targets. Stated simply, 
activist hedge funds are leaving private equity firms with fewer public 
companies to fix. 
B. Venture Capital Funds 
While activist hedge funds have made public-company targets less attractive 
or less available for private equity acquisitions, venture capital funds are doing 
the same for many private-company targets. Venture capital and LBOs are 
generally viewed as entirely distinct investment strategies.75 Venture capital 
investments are traditionally made in early stage companies, where capital needs 
are severe, cash flows are highly uncertain and often negative, and debt-
financing is therefore precluded.76 By contrast, private equity funds—referring 
here to LBO funds—target mature companies with stable cash flows, which are 
able to take on substantial debt loads.77 Thus, not only do venture capital and 
private equity traditionally differ as to what stage in the firm lifecycle they favor, 
they also differ as to what industries they target: venture capital investments are 
heavily tilted toward the tech industry, for example, while LBO funds favor 
industries such as retail.78 
This division of labor has changed, however, in light of the long-term decline 
in the proportion of public companies in the United States and the ongoing glut 
of private capital.79 Venture capital and private equity are no longer ships 
passing in the night. With founders choosing to keep their companies private 
substantially longer than in prior decades, venture capital funds can no longer 
 
74 See Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows 1 (Harv. 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 17-062, 2017), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_ 
center/papers/pdf/Fried_897.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4FG-6YPA] (noting that activist tactics 
“impact any firm that might be targeted by activist shareholders, not just those that are actually 
targeted”). 
75 See, e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 7, at 121; Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, 
Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey, 17 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 619, 619 (2011). 
76 See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture 
Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1461 (1995). 
77 See id. at 1472. 
78 See id. at 1471. 
79 See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. 
FIN. ECON. 464, 472-73 (2017). 
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rely on a rapid initial public offering (“IPO”) exit from their successful 
investments.80 Rather, private firms may go through multiple rounds of venture 
capital financing, with ever longer holding periods, until they finally exit 
through an IPO or, more likely, a sale to a strategic acquirer.81 
The upshot is that many firms that, in prior decades, would have been natural 
targets for private equity acquisitions are today still in venture capital funds’ 
hands, and the latter show little sign of letting go.82 
C. Strategic Acquirers 
Private equity arguably faces its most severe competition from so-called 
strategic acquirers—ordinary operating companies (as opposed to “financial” 
investors such as private equity funds) that are on the lookout for potential 
acquisition targets. M&A transactions by strategic acquirers have dramatically 
outpaced IPOs in recent years; after recovering from the financial crisis of 2008-
2009, U.S. companies found themselves with excess cash on their balance 
sheets, ready to be deployed.83 Acquisitions have proven to be a popular 
strategy; technological change and globalization entail increasing economies of 
scale and scope for firms,84 while relatively weak antitrust enforcement has 
made industry consolidation attractive.85 
In one respect, the rise in strategic acquisitions is good for private equity: big 
companies overburdened with cash will snatch up portfolio companies when 
their private-equity-fund owners are looking to sell.86 This benefit at the exit 
stage is more than offset, however, by the fact that strategic acquirers compete 
 
80 See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 11, at 1672; Scott Kupor, Where Have All the IPOs 
Gone?, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 19, 2017), https://a16z.com/2017/06/19/ipos/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2TBU-JXMS]. 
81 See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 11, at 1690. 
82 More generally, to the extent that we are in the midst of a long-term economic shift away 
from retail and towards the tech and health care/drug industries—a matter of some debate—
then venture capital will increasingly be the funding source of choice for firms. 
83 See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 11, at 1672; Juan M. Sánchez & Emircan Yurdagul, 
Why Are Corporations Holding So Much Cash?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/january-2013/why-are-
corporations-holding-so-much-cash [https://perma.cc/33BR-ZJKR]. 
84 See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 11, at 1664. 
85 See Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust 
Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 13 (2012); William A. Galston & Clara 
Hendrickson, A Policy at Peace with Itself: Antitrust Remedies for Our Concentrated, 
Uncompetitive Economy, BROOKINGS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-
policy-at-peace-with-itself-antitrust-remedies-for-our-concentrated-uncompetitive-economy/ 
[https://perma.cc/7RDN-CNXU]; Kadhim Shubber, US Antitrust Enforcement Falls to 
Slowest Rate Since 1970s, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/27a0a34e-
f2a0-11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f. 
86 See Han T.J. Smit, Acquisition Strategies as Option Games, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
79, 82 (2001) (describing how exits available to private equity firm under “buy-and-build” 
strategy are either to sell to strategic buyer or financial buyer or to pursue IPO). 
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with private equity firms to make portfolio investments in the first place.87 
Because strategic acquirers typically expect substantial synergies (such as 
economies of scale and scope) or other profit opportunities from an acquisition 
(such as eliminating a competitor), they can afford to pay significantly more than 
the current value of the target firm as a stand-alone entity.88 Financial buyers 
such as private equity firms do not have that luxury, because they typically 
continue to hold the target firm post-acquisition as a stand-alone entity.89 It is 
therefore crucial for their investors’ returns that the private equity fund not 
overpay for the target from the outset. 
But with strategic acquirers lurking around every corner today, private equity 
firms are regularly competing head-to-head with them for acquisitions, causing 
private equity firms either to lose out on many investment opportunities or to 
dramatically overpay for them.90 With consolidation being the strategy du jour 
in many industries,91 strategic acquirers are very likely to set the price in the vast 
majority of auctions for target companies, which is bad news for private equity.92  
Of course, while strategic acquirers have the advantage of synergies, private 
equity acquirers have traditionally had the advantage of leverage.93 Because 
debt-financing is tax-advantaged relative to equity financing,94 and strategic 
acquirers are relatively less likely to make leveraged acquisitions, private equity 
firms have at times been able to beat strategic acquirers for attractive targets, 
despite the absence of synergies.95 Here again, however, trouble is looming for 
private equity. The dramatic decrease in U.S. corporate income tax rates 
(courtesy of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017)96 has been heralded by the 
private equity industry and its advisors as a major boon to the industry simply 
because most private equity portfolio companies, like all other corporations, will 
now pay less in tax. This misses a fundamental point, however: lower corporate 
 
87 See Jana P. Fidrmuc et al., One Size Does Not Fit All: Selling Firms to Private Equity 
Versus Strategic Acquirers, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 828, 829 (2012) (describing differing 
characteristics and incentives of private equity and strategic buyers). 
88 See Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts 
Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1980 (2008); BAIN & 
CO., supra note 16, at 5. 
89 See Bartlett III, supra note 88, at 2003. 
90 See BAIN & CO., supra note 16, at 5. 
91 For example, nearly half of all externally acquired inventions in the pharmaceutical 
industry are obtained through M&A. See Ashish Arora, Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, 
The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in American Manufacturing: Incidence 
and Impact, 45 RES. POL’Y 1113, 1113 (2016). 
92 See Richard Dobbs, Marc Goedhart & Hannu Suonio, Are Companies Getting Better at 
M&A?, MCKINSEY Q. (Dec. 2006), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/articles/better_merge 
rs.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWJ8-D5CV]. 
93 See Bartlett III, supra note 88, at 2017. 
94 Id. at 1985. 
95 Id. at 2010-11. 
96 Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2096 (2017). 
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tax rates mean less of an advantage to debt financing over equity financing,97 
and therefore less of an advantage to private equity bidders over strategic 
acquirers. Thus, the boon of the new tax regime is better viewed as a bane for 
private equity, by making it that much harder for private equity funds to compete 
with strategic acquirers when bidding for target companies.98 
Viewed another way, the M&A market today is all grown up: private equity 
no longer has an advantage over other players in terms of sourcing deals, 
optimizing financing and taxation, or otherwise, simply by virtue of having 
repeated experience with M&A transactions. As a consequence, it will be 
increasingly difficult for LBO funds to get their foot in the door with the 
dwindling share of attractive targets.  
To summarize this Part, external competition is leaving private equity with 
fewer opportunities and incentives to pursue governance improvements in U.S. 
companies. The next Part examines private equity’s response to its new 
competitive environment. 
III. CONFLICTS AND COMPLEXITY 
In a 2009 article, Professors William Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson 
identified the beginnings of a shift in the private equity model, namely an 
expansion from LBOs into other strategies and even other asset classes.99 The 
authors further warned of the resulting potential for new conflicts of interest 
involving private equity sponsors.100 The article proved remarkably prescient—
the phenomenon it describes has raised concerns for private equity’s investors 
and regulators ever since.  
This increase in conflicts is only one aspect of the changing face of private 
equity in response to competition. This Part briefly describes these conflicts as 
well as other developments that are likely to alter the industry’s impact on 
corporate governance. These changes do not simply mean that private equity 
will likely devote less attention to governance going forward. This Part explains 
why the new private equity strategies could potentially have an ambiguous or 
even negative governance impact. 
 
97 For purposes of calculating their income tax, corporations may generally deduct interest 
payments to their debtholders, whereas they may not deduct payments (such as dividends or 
stock repurchases) to their shareholders. See Bartlett, supra note 88, at 1987. Thus, all else 
being equal, there is a substantial tax advantage to the corporation from financing itself with 
debt, rather than with equity. Moreover, the higher the then-applicable corporate income tax 
rates, the greater the amount of tax savings for any given dollar amount of interest payments. 
98 In addition, the new rules from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that limit the deductibility of 
interest in highly leveraged companies are unambiguously bad for private equity. 
99 William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment 
Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 45 (2009). 
100 See id. at 54-55. 
  
2019] THE PRIVATE EQUITY GOVERNANCE ADVANTAGE 1113 
 
A. Beyond LBOs 
Corporate governance was an obvious focal point for private equity firms 
when their sole investment strategy was to sell companies for more than they 
paid for them. If better governance caused firm value to increase either directly 
(by reducing managerial shirking, for example), or indirectly (by leading to more 
efficient operations), then it would boost private equity returns, and the 
sponsors’ investment professionals would be incentivized ex ante to chase them. 
However, intense competition and the shrinking set of opportunities for 
governance improvements have prompted the larger private equity firms to 
branch out from LBOs to other strategies and even other asset classes.101 In fact, 
private equity sponsors no longer require control of their portfolio 
investments—they are increasingly content to partner with other investors and 
to take minority stakes in companies, even public ones.102 Given that monitoring 
incentives increase and decrease with the size of equity investments103 and that 
minority investments offer lower returns relative to buyouts,104 we should expect 
private equity firms to play a lesser role in firm governance for these minority 
investments. 
As discussed, the largest private equity firms now sponsor funds in a wide 
array of asset classes—anything from real estate to commodity futures. Most 
strikingly, many now manage both equity and debt funds.105 Apollo, Blackstone, 
and KKR each have more assets in their credit funds than in their equity funds.106 
On the one hand, this reflects a rational response to overcrowding in the LBO 
space, and it capitalizes on private equity firms’ financial sophistication and 
ability to navigate the capital markets. On the other, credit funds have very 
different incentives and require different expertise than equity funds. For that 
reason, they have traditionally been the domain of hedge funds or specialized 
credit-fund sponsors.  
Holding both equity and debt positions creates conflicts of interest for the 
sponsor. In highly leveraged businesses, which is where these funds invest, 
debtholders’ interests may diverge significantly from those of the 
equityholders.107 This makes it all the more remarkable that private equity 
sponsors may manage funds that are simultaneously invested in the equity and 
 
101 See Tuch, supra note 23, at 340-41. 
102 See Guojun Chen et al., Sources of Value Gains in Minority Equity Investments by 
Private Equity Funds: Evidence from Block Share Acquisitions, 29 J. CORP. FIN. 449, 449-50 
(2014); Tuch, supra note 23, at 340-41. 
103 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 
94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 462-63 (1986). 
104 See Benjamin Puche & Christoph Lotz, Private Equity Minority Investments, 18 J. PRIV. 
EQUITY 46, 46-47 (2015). 
105 See Tuch, supra note 23, at 354-55; Vandevelde, supra note 25. 
106 Tuch, supra note 23, at 356-57. 
107 See James A. Brander & Michel Poitevin, Managerial Compensation and the Agency 
Costs of Debt Finance, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 55, 55 (1992). 
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the debt of the same portfolio company.108 In such cases, investors in both the 
equity fund and the credit fund will worry that the interests of the sponsor may 
cause it to favor the other. Moreover, even if the equity and debt funds operate 
independently and do not share information, the funds’ common affiliation 
imposes risks on both sets of investors (such as negative treatment in 
bankruptcy) that they may not have priced in.109  
Beyond the obvious concerns for the respective fund investors, however, lies 
a governance concern for the portfolio company itself. Ex ante, common 
ownership of equity and debt from the outset reduces agency costs from the 
classic shareholder-creditor conflict and could therefore increase firm value.110 
The result may be different, however, if the common ownership arises ex post. 
If a sponsor’s fund acquires the debt of a portfolio company already owned by 
another of its funds, the agency costs have already been priced in and addressed 
in the debt covenants. Common ownership at this stage may simply create 
uncertainty about the portfolio company’s governance. While self-interested 
investors are a given in corporate finance, conflicted investors are more 
problematic, particularly when they have control. Conflicts create uncertainty as 
to how the investor will ultimately behave and make it less likely that the 
behavior will be value increasing for the company.  
Even within the LBO strategy, the recent proliferation of funds entails intense 
competition for investment opportunities. This exacerbates existing conflicts of 
interest for any private equity firm that is simultaneously managing two or more 
LBO funds. Traditionally, private equity firms negotiate with their investors for 
the right to launch a new fund (a “successor fund”) with the same investment 
strategy as the firm’s existing fund, once the latter has succeeded in deploying 
most of its capital.111 But the extraordinarily favorable fundraising climate for 
private equity has meant that private equity firms are successfully compressing 
the time between funds from more than five years to less than three and a half.112 
 
108 See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 99, at 57. 
109 In particular, the debt fund investors should be concerned about equitable subordination 
or debt recharacterization—the possibility that the bankruptcy court will choose to treat the 
company debt held by the fund as equity, as a result of actions taken by the sponsor whose 
fund also holds the company’s stock. See James W. Wilton & William A. McGee, The Past 
and Future of Debt Recharacterization, 74 BUS. LAW. 91, 91-93 (2018). 
110 See Wei Jiang, Kai Li & Pei Shao, When Shareholders Are Creditors: Effects of the 
Simultaneous Holding of Equity and Debt by Non-Commercial Banking Institutions, 23 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 3595, 3595 (2010) (finding evidence that loan spreads are relatively lower in firms 
with non-bank investors that hold both equity and debt positions). 
111 See DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: KEY BUSINESS, LEGAL AND 
TAX ISSUES 45 (2015), https://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/news/2015/pe_fun 
dskey%20business_legal_tax_issues.pdf; Practical Law Corp. & Sec., Limited Partnership 
Agreement (LPA) for Private Equity Fund § 4.06, THOMAS REUTERS PRAC. L., W-000-5447 
(2019). 
112 See BAIN & CO., supra note 16, at 19 (“A look at the 20 largest buyout firms globally 
shows that the gap between closing one fund and starting another has compressed to 40 
months, from 62 months five years ago.”). 
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This has several implications. Necessarily, a greater proportion of managers’ 
time is being taken up by fundraising, as opposed to investment analysis, 
execution, and monitoring.113 Further, the conflicts that have long existed 
between successor and predecessor funds are made more severe. Difficult 
questions that arise include how a sponsor should allocate investment 
opportunities among its various funds and whether the sponsor should be able to 
cause its funds to buy and sell investments from one another.114 
Not surprisingly, managing such conflicts now takes up a non-negligible 
amount of both the principals’ and investors’ time. The fund disclosures and 
provisions dealing with conflicted transactions have increased dramatically in 
length.115 Yet even where the potential for such conflicts is extensively 
disclosed, there will always remain some uncertainty on the investor side as to 
how severe they will be in practice and how well the private equity firm will 
navigate them.116 Investors in an LBO fund may not truly be prepared for the 
possibility that the sponsor will take a position effectively adverse to theirs. The 
recent enforcement actions by the SEC targeting conflicts of interest in private 
equity funds suggest that even the most sophisticated private equity investors 
can indeed be caught off guard by their sponsors’ behavior.117 
Conflicts of interest are not bad per se. Private equity has lived with conflicts 
of interest between the sponsor and fund investors from the beginning, as a result 
of how the sponsor is compensated for advising the fund.118 These conflicts have 
long been identified and managed, with varying success. Presumably, investors 
view them as a necessary and acceptable tradeoff for the potential to earn high 
returns. 
What, then, distinguishes the new crop of conflicts created by private equity’s 
shifting business model? First, they may significantly exacerbate private 
equity’s existing conflicts, in today’s highly competitive environment. Second, 
they are largely avoidable. Unlike the original conflicts of interest from the 
 
113 See Toby Mitchenall, Capital Is Abundant, but Time Is Scarce, PRIV. EQUITY INT’L 
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.privateequityinternational.com/capital-abundant-time-scarce/ 
[https://perma.cc/3STE-GUSS]. 
114 See Chris Shelling, The Troubling New Trend in Private Equity, INSTITUTIONAL INV. 
(July 25, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1975pyqdk96xl/The-Troublin 
g-New-Trend-in-Private-Equity (describing practice of having one fund sell its portfolio 
company to the same sponsor’s successor fund, potentially triggering gains and transaction 
fees payable to the sponsor). 
115 See Albert J. Hudec, Negotiating Private Equity Fund Terms: The Shifting Balance of 
Power, BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 2010, at 45, 47-49. 
116 See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 99, at 59; Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of 
Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 263-65 (2010). 
117 See, e.g., Apollo Mgmt. V, L.P., Investment Advisors Act of 1940 Release No. IA-
4493, 114 SEC Docket 5543 (Aug. 23, 2016); Blackstone Mgmt. Partners L.L.C., Investment 
Advisors Act of 1940 Release No. IA-4219, 112 SEC Docket 3484 (Oct. 7, 2015). 
118 See Ludovic Phalippou, Beware of Venturing into Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 
147, 162-64 (2009) (describing major conflicts of interest created by private equity’s 
compensation scheme, and their potential effect of firm value and investor returns). 
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private equity compensation model, these conflicts reflect the sponsor’s own 
decision to expand into different strategies and asset classes and to fundraise 
more frequently. That decision in turn appears to benefit the sponsor more than 
investors.  
In the mutual fund context, the standard practice of having the fund group 
manage a large number of different funds is justified by economies of scale: for 
example, it allows the significant regulatory and compliance costs to be spread 
across funds.119 Yet the argument for economies of scale is far less compelling 
in the private equity world, which faces dramatically less regulation. As such, it 
is not immediately clear why a LBO fund and a credit fund managed by the same 
sponsor would be preferable for investors than two unaffiliated, specialized 
sponsors. Moreover, the resulting conflicts are much harder for investors to 
manage in the private equity world, because there is little direct regulation of 
such conflicts, and because investors have very limited exit rights.120 Instead, 
investors must rely almost exclusively on contract. Yet contracting around 
burgeoning, ever-changing conflicts of interest is a difficult and costly 
exercise.121 
The advantage of private equity has always been its single-minded pursuit of 
investor returns. But it is not always clear today which of their investors private 
equity sponsors are working for. In fact, we have seen all of this before with 
investment banks. For M&A advisory work, for example, boutique advisors 
have been gaining market share from the major investment banks as clients seek 
to avoid Wall Street’s myriad conflicts of interest.122 Will the same eventually 
prove true of the major private equity sponsors? Will investors tire of trying to 
predict which of the firms’ competing loyalties will prevail in any instance? In 
the meantime, we are left with considerable uncertainty as to how private equity 
conflicts affect the behavior and value of its portfolio companies.  
B. Organizational Complexity 
Expansion into other asset classes is not the only driver of private equity’s 
accelerating conflicts and complexity. Most private equity firms today are now 
significantly bigger organizations, as a result not only of venturing into other 
asset classes and jurisdictions,123 but also of regulatory change and investor 
 
119 See Morley, supra note 38, at 1261 (arguing that investment adviser conflicts of interest 
may reflect efficiency-enhancing economies of scale from offering multiple funds). 
120 See id. at 1267. 
121 See William W. Clayton, The Private Equity Negotiation Myth, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 
(forthcoming) (arguing that terms of private equity limited partnership agreements are 
unlikely to be efficiently negotiated, given that large investors routinely negotiate separate 
terms in side letters). 
122 See Weihong Song, Jie (Diana) Wei & Lei Zhou, The Value of “Boutique” Financial 
Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions, 20 J. CORP. FIN. 94, 94 (2013); Dana Cimilluca & Telis 
Demos, ‘Boutiques’ Thrive in M&A Advice, WALL STREET J. (June 26, 2014, 7:55 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boutiques-thrive-in-m-a-advice-1403823530. 
123 Private equity sponsors are no longer simply the U.S.- and U.K.-based going-private 
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demands. Until recently, private equity firms had a reputation for being leanly 
staffed.124 Not only did this allow for more profits per investment professional, 
it also ensured that the interests of each such investment professional would be 
closely aligned with those of the private equity firm as a whole. 
Today’s private equity firms often have a considerably larger workforce, and 
one that is increasingly composed of non-investment professionals, in areas such 
as marketing, legal, compliance, investor relations, government relations, and 
human resources.125 Following Dodd-Frank, virtually all private equity firms 
other than the very smallest are required to register as investment advisers under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.126 While the resulting regulatory burdens 
on private equity firms are light compared to those for mutual fund advisers,127 
they are not negligible, and they entail greater staffing needs.128 Accordingly, 
major private equity firms today look less like the small, scrappy teams of yore 
than like the large mutual fund advisers and investment banks. 
This pronounced increase in size and scope necessarily introduces some 
divergence between the interests of the individual investment principals that 
make up the private equity firm and those of the private equity firm itself. This 
 
specialists of the late 1980s. With Warburg Pincus as the possible exception that proves the 
rule, the largest private equity shops have created specialized subdivisions and have raised 
multiple concurrent funds in multiple countries, aimed at varying markets like Asian real 
estate and mezzanine debt. Michael J. de la Merced & Peter Lattman, Warburg Stays in the 
Fray, but off the Public Market, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 17, 2011, 9:07 PM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/warburg-stays-in-fray-but-off-public-market/. 
124 See Jensen, supra note 2, at 70. 
125 As of the end of 2017, KKR employed 378 investment professionals out of 1,184 
employees. KKR & Co. L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 26 (Feb. 23, 2018). In 2011, 
217 out of KKR’s 916 employees were investment professionals. KKR & Co. L.P., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 20 (Feb. 27, 2012). Michael Jensen’s 1989 study found that KKR had 
sixteen professionals and forty-four other employees. Jensen, supra note 2, at 70. Virtually 
all of the Carlyle Group’s employee headcount increase of two hundred between 2012 and 
2017 can be accounted for by non-investment professionals. Compare The Carlyle Group 
L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 15, 2018), with The Carlyle Group L.P., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 14, 2013). 
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2012) (establishing the general registration requirement for 
investment advisers); 17 CFR § 275.203(m)-1 (2018) (exempting from registration 
requirement private fund advisers managing less than one hundred and fifty million dollars in 
assets). 
127 See Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years After the Dodd-Frank Act, 35 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 624, 631 (2016) (concluding that early fears about the burden of 
Dodd-Frank on private investment funds were not borne out); Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi 
& Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance?—Evidence 
from 2010-2015 (July 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629347 (finding no support for the private fund industry’s claims 
that Dodd-Frank had a negative effect on private fund earnings). 
128 See Wulf A. Kaal, What Drives Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost for Private Funds?, 
15 J. ALTERNATIVE INV. 8, 13 (2016) (providing cost estimates of Dodd-Frank compliance for 
private investment advisers based on survey data). 
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potentially poses problems for sponsors seeking to maintain a reputation for 
good behavior towards their investors, creditors, and counterparties, such as by 
avoiding conflicts or not exploiting them to the investors’ detriment.129 As 
discussed, even the original private equity model involves inherent conflicts of 
interest, but it is these conflicts that make a sponsor’s reputational capital 
particularly valuable. Yet the recent growth in headcount creates the potential 
for misaligned incentives internally, and therefore may make it harder for 
sponsors to maintain their hard-earned reputations. This should be especially 
true of the private equity firms that are themselves now public companies, such 
as Apollo, Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR.130 As with the investment banks, the 
shift from being a private firm owned by its principals to a public company 
should alter both organizational and individual behavior over time.131 While this 
is likely to lead to a continued emphasis on profits for the sponsor, there may be 
less agreement internally as to the means by which to achieve them and the 
importance of the firm’s long-run reputational capital.132 
C. Contractual Complexity and Bespoke Arrangements 
A further challenge for the private equity industry is the rapid increase in the 
complexity of its contracts and arrangements with investors. Some of this, as we 
have seen, results from increasing conflicts among the sponsors’ own funds. 
Some results from tailoring to investor requests in the more competitive 
environment. Growing dissatisfaction with the “two and twenty” compensation 
scheme—which awards two percent per annum of the fund’s commitments and 
a twenty percent share of all investment profits to the private equity manager—
has driven investors to alter their arrangements with private equity firms.133 
Rather than reduce the rates charged by their funds (to “one and fifteen,” for 
example), which would apply to their investors across the board, many firms 
have instead begun providing different economic and other arrangements to 
 
129 For a private equity sponsor, or any organization for that matter, acquiring and 
maintaining reputational capital requires frequently forgoing short-term gain from “bad” 
behavior, on the theory that having a good reputation will lead to greater gain in the long run. 
However, the more the interests of the individuals making up the organization diverge from 
the interests of the organization itself, the more difficult it will be for the organization to 
maintain its reputation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the 
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002). 
130 Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 
61-62 (2008). 
131 See Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, The Demise of Investment Banking 
Partnerships: Theory and Evidence, 63 J. FIN. 311, 311-12 (2008). 
132 See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Role of Private Equity Group 
Reputation in LBO Financing, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 306 (2010) (showing that more reputable 
private equity sponsors benefit from more favorable debt financing for their portfolio 
companies). 
133 For a description of this compensation scheme, see Fleischer, supra note 28, at 8. 
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different investors.134 Thus, investors in the fund with more bargaining power 
than the average investor negotiate for special arrangements in the form of side 
letters, opportunities to co-invest in portfolio investments directly alongside the 
fund, or even separate accounts (management of their capital entirely outside of 
a fund structure).135 
 The complexity of these arrangements, and the time and resources needed to 
negotiate and comply with them on an ongoing basis, are significant.136 Of 
course, we should expect that in agreeing to such arrangements, each private 
equity firm balances the costs and benefits of doing so. Yet now that it has 
become standard practice for large investors to obtain tailored arrangements and 
contracts, it is increasingly difficult for any individual sponsor to push back. The 
market has only moved in one direction, namely toward greater individualization 
and complexity.137 While individual investors have an incentive to negotiate for 
separate rights from the sponsor, from the perspective of the industry as a whole, 
this is unlikely to be efficient.138 
This matters, because the complexity of a private equity sponsor’s internal 
organization and of its external contractual commitments to investors makes it 
less nimble—not only less focused on the investment side of the business, 
perhaps, but also more constrained in its investment options to begin with. For 
example, a side letter provision requiring the fund to excuse a particular investor 
before making investments in certain industries could result in the fund 
foregoing such investments entirely, even where there are profits to be made. 
Thus, once again, we have less clarity today as to whether sponsors’ treatment 
of any given portfolio company will be value-maximizing. 
 
134 For example, anchor investors are able to negotiate for reductions in the management 
fee percentage. See Ingo Stoff & Reiner Braun, The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms 
Beyond 2 and 20, 26 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 65, 71-72 (2014). 
135 See William Clayton, Preferential Treatment and the Rise of Individualized Investing 
in Private Equity, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 249, 270-79 (2017); William Magnuson, The Public 
Cost of Private Equity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1847, 1885-86 (2018); Josh Lerner et al., Investing 
Outside the Box: Evidence from Alternative Vehicles in Private Capital 3-4, 13-14 (Harvard 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 19-012, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=3230145. 
136 See Marco da Rin & Ludovic Phalippou, Investor Size and Division of Labor: Evidence 
from a Survey of Private Equity Limited Partners 4-5 (Saïd Bus. Sch., Univ. of Oxford, 
Research Paper RP 2014-15, 2014), http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/5315/1/2014-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V93N-FXBZ] (finding that most limited partners always negotiate limited 
partnership agreement contract terms). 
137 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, 2018/2019 PRIVATE EQUITY YEAR END REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 
3 (Dec. 2018) (discussing increasingly bespoke arrangements between private equity funds 
and their investors). 
138 But see Clayton, supra note 135, at 254 (arguing that individually tailored arrangements 
for private equity investors is value enhancing). 
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D. Financial Games 
Private equity sponsors’ incentives to generate returns of any kind and from 
any source are generally viewed by investors as a positive feature of the industry. 
Yet in a highly competitive environment, the pressure to show returns early and 
often can ironically lead to behavior that is either neutral or bad for investors 
and portfolio companies. Given private equity managers’ particular skillset, this 
behavior often involves clever games with financing.139 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the effort and resources devoted to 
managing their funds’ internal rate of return (“IRR”). A fund’s IRR measures 
the return on the capital that the fund invests in portfolio companies and other 
investments.140 Importantly, for any given payoff from an investment, the IRR 
figure decreases the longer the fund’s capital has been invested before the payoff 
occurred.141 For example, assume that a fund invests one hundred million dollars 
of its own capital in a portfolio company, and later nets one hundred and fifty 
million dollars from selling it. The IRR in this case is significantly higher if the 
company was sold one year after the fund acquired it, as opposed to five years 
(all else being equal). 
Predictably, then, private equity firms have realized that they can increase 
their IRR in one of two ways. First, of course, they can produce higher returns. 
Second, they can game the IRR calculation by realizing returns faster, or, 
equivalently, by keeping investors’ money for a shorter amount of time.142 Now 
that competition has made it challenging to produce high returns, private equity 
firms have had to resort to the second option of shortening the holding period 
for investors’ money. A now common way of achieving this is for private equity 
funds to obtain capital call facilities from banks.143 Rather than call investor 
capital at the time the fund plans to make an investment, the fund may instead 
draw down on its capital call facility and use the borrowed funds to make the 
investment instead. Eventually, the fund will call capital from investors and use 
this to repay the loan from the bank. Borrowing to fund capital calls increases 
the fund’s IRR by allowing the fund to shorten the period in which it holds its 
 
139 Sponsors’ desire to minimize their tax burden may also lead to behavior that is 
suboptimal for investors and portfolio companies. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of 
Private Equity Tax Games, 146 TAX NOTES 615, 615 (2015). 
140 EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, ARE 
LOWER PRIVATE EQUITY RETURNS THE NEW NORMAL? 8 (2016). 
141 Id. at 8-9. 
142 Ludovic Phalippou, The Hazards of Measuring Performance with IRR: The Case of 
Private Equity, 12 J. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 55 (2008) (manuscript at 6), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1111796 (finding that the IRR 
calculation provides “strong incentives for fund managers to terminate good investments 
early”). 
143 See David Carey, Buyout Firms Are Magically—and Legally—Pumping Up Returns, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2017, 5:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-
13/buyout-firms-are-magically-and-legally-pumping-up-returns. 
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own investors’ capital, but because the fund must pay interest on the loan 
facility, it is not necessarily beneficial to investors. 
Capital call facilities originally were justified as very short-term borrowings 
to allow private equity funds to make investments on short notice, given that 
calling capital from investors typically requires fifteen days’ advance notice.144 
Yet funds are now borrowing under these facilities for months at a time, funding 
even large investments without their own investors’ capital.145 In principal, if 
the fund can avoid calling capital until just before the investment is sold, the 
fund’s resulting IRR will be infinite.146 Accordingly, empirical studies have 
found that private equity funds’ IRRs tend to have an upward bias.147 
Why is managing IRR so important to private equity sponsors? First, IRR is 
the single most commonly-used measure of a fund’s performance, making it a 
crucial component of the private equity firm’s marketing. For example, the 
private placement memorandum for a new fund typically reports the IRR of the 
sponsor’s predecessor funds in the same strategy.148 Second, the private equity 
sponsor’s compensation depends on its funds’ IRRs. Private equity funds 
typically distribute profits from their investments according to a specified 
priority (the “waterfall”).149 The waterfall generally provides that limited 
partners must recover their capital first, as well as an eight percent preferred 
return on their invested capital, before the private equity manager may receive 
any share of the profits.150 The preferred return is akin to an IRR calculation, 
however.151 Thus, the more the firm boosts IRR, the sooner the private equity 
manager can claim a share of the fund’s profits. 
At worst, these sorts of financial games are a means for private equity 
sponsors to deceive their own investors and potential investors. At best, they are 
distractions from a fund’s core investment strategy. As such, they are perhaps 
emblematic of private equity’s recent turn away from the traditional LBO 
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strategy of improving firm governance and operations, towards alternate means 
of showing returns. 
CONCLUSION 
Is private equity still special? Recent empirical studies call into question 
whether private equity’s returns remain exceptional today among the major asset 
classes. Yet we should also ask whether the means by which private equity 
generates those returns remains the same today as during prior decades. This 
Article argues that a combination of factors is pushing private equity away from 
its original contribution of improving firms’ governance and operations, towards 
a scattershot of tactics to boost returns. While reforming and restructuring 
companies is what brought private equity fame, the industry has since moved on 
to other things. To be clear, private equity is not going anywhere—it will remain 
influential and a powerful draw for capital for the foreseeable future. Yet its 
influence will likely be felt in areas other than corporate governance. 
 
